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  Municipal wastewater treatment plants are among the main sources of discharges 
of pollutants to the environment.  How well these plants are managed and perform does 
have a significant impact on the ambient quality of the environment.  The focus of this 
research is on the performance of public sector managers as compared to that of private 
sector managers. 
 
  In Canada, virtually all Ontario’s municipal treatment plants emitting to Lake Erie 
and Lake Ontario did not only comply with the existing emission standards for 
Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Suspended Solids (SS) and Phosphorus, but most 
performed considerably better than what was required.  This observed phenomenon may 
be called “voluntary overcompliance”.  Findings based on interviews with municipal 
treatment plant superintendents, recently retired plant superintendents, plant chemists, 
and other industry officials, clearly indicated that public sector managers have quite a 
number of different rationales for overcompliance. 
 
  Can private sector managers be expected to do the same, or do they yield to 
pressures to reduce costs at the expense of environmental quality?  Does it make a 
difference whether or not the variable costs for electricity, chemicals, and sludge disposal 
are pass through costs to the municipalities?  Furthermore, what are the major advantages 
of contracting?  Are there any drawbacks And will contracting result in cost-savings?  
These questions will be answered on the basis of the results of a nationwide survey of 







  I  INTRODUCTION:  INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 II  CONTRACTING FOR WASTEWATER TREATMENT 
   MAIN ADVANTAGES 
   MAIN DRAWBACKS 
III  WILL CONTRACTING RESULT IN COST-SAVINGS? 
IV  EFFLUENT QUALITY:  PUBLIC vs PRIVATE SECTOR 
PERFORMANCES 


































I  INTRODUCTION: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Throughout the world, privatization of water supply and sewerage services is a 
controversial topic of political debate.  Any nationalization, privatization, or alteration in 
the regulating regime constitutes a significant change of the institutional mechanism of 
water management.  The focus of this paper will be on the institutional arrangements 
most commonly found in Canada and the United States.  For the sake of clarity and 
contrast the main historical developments in England and Wales will be briefly outlined 
at the outset. 
Prior to 1973, as Table 1 shows, there were 29 Statutory (private) water 
companies and a complex mixture of public sector groups, including municipal utilities, 
in England and Wales.  In 1973, the municipally owned industry was restructured on the 
basis of geographic rather than political or administrative boundaries, and the Water and 
Sewerage Authorities were created based in and serving ten regions in England and 
Wales.  These ten publicly owned Water Authorities were reconstituted in 1989 as private 
companies owning the infrastructure network and assets of the industry.  They were then 
floated on the Stock Exchange as ten companies whose main subsidiary supplied water 
and sewerage services.  Due to takeovers and mergers the number of statutory water only 
companies was reduced from 29 to 19 by April 1996.  Economic regulation is being 
carried out by a national organization, The Office of Water Services (OFWAT).   
Comprehensive assessments of the performance of this newly privatized water industry 
can be found in Shaoul, (1997) and Letza and Smallman, (2001). 
In Canada and the United States, two principal modes of producing local 
government services are in-house provision by government employees, and contracting 
out to private suppliers, also known as privatization.  Compared to the British context, the 
term privatization now has quite a different meaning.  Under a purchase-of-service 
contract, the public authority retains ownership but awards a competitive bid to a private 
vendor for operating and maintenance.  There is now no need for systematic economic 
regulation. Only emission standards and staffing levels (in some cases) are imposed by 
provincial and state levels of government. 
As Table 1 shows, in both countries the water supply is managed in-house by 




companies in the case of the United States.  In Ontario, however, the Ontario Clean 
Water Agency, a public sector agency, manages water supply on behalf of 18% of the 
water utilities.  In only 2% of the municipalities do private companies supply water. 
As far as wastewater treatment is concerned the public sector-private sector 
breakdown in Ontario is the same as for water supply: 98% vs 2%.  Here the Ontario 
Clean Water Agency (OCWA) plays a greater role, managing more than half of all 
facilities.  OCWA actively competes with private companies for contracts.  It’s success in 
winning contracts explains, in part at least, the very limited role of private firms in 
Ontario. 
In the United States contracting for wastewater treatment started in the early 
1980’s (Holcombe, 1991).  By now private firms have a market share of about 3%.   
Many municipal officials are satisfied with this arrangement.  However, there were 
others, as we shall see, who were not.  This resulted in the cancellation and/or non-






















Table 1        WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT: 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
GREAT BRITAIN 
Before 1973:  WATER SUPPLY  WASTEWATER 
TREATMENT 
29 STATUTORY WATER COMPANIES 
(private sector monopolies) 
25% - 
A COMPLEX MIXTURE OF PUBLIC 
SECTOR GROUPS, INCL. MUNICIPAL 
UTILITIES 
75% 100% 
Water act of 1973 
29 STATUTORY WATER COMPANIES 
(private sector monopolies) 
25% - 
10 REGIONAL WATER AUTHORITIES  75%  100% 
Water act of 1989    
29 (NOW 19) STATUTORY WATER 
COMPANIES 
25% - 
10 WATER SERVICE PUBLIC LIMITED 
COMPANIES  
(Large private sector monopolies) 
75% 96% 
 
CANADA  (Ontario only) – 657 WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS 
    454  WASTEWATER  TREATMENT  SYSTEMS 
FACILITIES OPERATED BY  WATER SUPPLY  WASTEWATER 
TREATMENT 
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES  519 (70%)  209 (46%) 
ONTARIO CLEAN WATER AGENCY*  123 (18%)  234 (52%) 
PRIVATE COMPANIES  15 ( 2%)  11 ( 2%) 
*ONTARIO CLEAN WATER AGENCY is a PUBLIC SECTOR AGENCY  
 
UNITED STATES  - 34,000 WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS and, 
                      15,000 WASTEWATER TREATMENT SYSTEMS 
 
FACILITIES OPERATED BY:  WATER SUPPLY  WASTEWATER 
TREATMENT 
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES  80%  97% 





II.  CONTRACTING FOR WASTEWATER TREATMENT: 
ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS 
MAIN ADVANTAGES: 
In order to become informed about contract operations for wastewater treatment 
some 240 city and municipal authorities all across the United States were contacted with 
the request to complete a four-page questionnaire.  In total the response rate was close to 
fifty percent.  Fully completed questionnaires were received covering 91 contracts and a 
further 16 were received from places that had decided to discontinue contracting in the 
recent past.  In this latter group one or more reasons for non-renewal were given by a 
municipal official.  Although the questionnaires were sent to municipal officials, the 
clients, out of the 91 a total of 65 were completed by a municipal official and the 
remaining 26 by their contractor. 
A summary of the main advantages as perceived by 65 municipal officials is 
found in Table 2A.  It comes as no surprise that the list is headed by gaining the benefits 
of the Contractor’s Resources.  These include expertise, experience, knowledge, trained 
staff and quality personnel, and professional services and technical support. 
Second in terms of response frequency are Cost Savings (in 15 cases), and Cost 
Control (in 7 cases).  Administrative Convenience is also acknowledged by a fair number 
of respondents, as well as Liability Protection and Risk Shifting.  It is somewhat 
surprising perhaps, in light of the acknowledged contractors’ quality resources, that 
Higher Quality Service was mentioned only in a few cases.  In the last part of the paper 
we will take a closer look at this and learn that the contracting firms do very well in terms 
of meeting emission requirements. 
MAIN DRAWBACKS: 
Table 2B summarizes the views of municipal officials pertaining to drawbacks of 
contracting. The responses included here are those of 65 administrators where contracts 
are still in force and those of 16 administrators of operations where contracts had not 
been renewed.  The main reasons cited for non-renewal were Inadequate Contractor 




Higher Cost were noted in a further 8 cases.  A third frequently mentioned drawback 
related to control, either as Reduced Control or Loss of Control. 
Surprisingly few municipal officials mentioned Negotiating a Contract or 
Contract Management and Monitoring.  With contracts in place and lasting, in the 
majority of cases, 5 years or longer, contract negotiation was often a matter of the past.  
Therefore, we learned from a different questionnaire question that relatively few major 
changes were made at contract renewal time.  Contract management and monitoring 
resources were arranged for in at least 35 (out of 91) municipalities.  
 
TABLE 2A                 MAIN ADVANTAGES OF CONTRACTING 
 
1.  CONTRACTOR’S RESOURCES 
   EXPERTISE,  EXPERIENCVE,  KNOWLEDGE   18 
   PROFESSIONAL STAFF, QUALITY PERSONNEL        6 
   PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, TECHNICAL SUPPORT      5 
 
2.  COST SAVINGS AND COST CONTROL 
   C O S T   S A V I N G S          1 5  
   FIXED COST, COST CONTINUITY, LEVELING         7 
 
3.  ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE 
   NO STAFF TRAINING, SUPERVISION, HASSELS         6 
   DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS BY OTHERS          4 
   ABILITY TO FOCUS EFFORTS ELSEWHERE        1 
 
4.  LIABILITY PROTECTION AND RISK SHIFTING 
   CONTRACTOR IS UP-TO-DATE WITH NEW RULES AND     5 
REGULATIONS 
   INCREASED LIABILITY PROTECTION, SOME RISK      4 
SHIFTING 
 
5.  HIGHER QUALITY OF SERVICES 
   IMPROVED PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE        3 
   BETTER  SAFETY  RECORDS           1 









TABLE 2B                   MAIN DRAWBACKS OF CONTRACTING 
 
1.  INADEQUATE CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE 
   REASON CITED IN 7 OUT OF 16 CASES OF NON-RENEWAL   7 
   CONTRACT DELIVERABLES ARE NOT ACHIEVED     1 
   LOW  SERVICES  TO  INFRASTRUCTURE       1 
 
2. HIGHER  COST 
   REASON CITED IN 13 OUT OF 16 CASES OF NON-RENEWAL  13 
   HIGHER COST (4), POSSIBLY HIGHER COST (4)        8 
 
3.  REDUCED CONTROL OR LOSS OF CONTROL 
   REDUCED  OR  LOSS  OF  CONTROL      12 
   RESPONSE TIME TO CRITICAL WORK         1 
   KEEPING CONTRACTOR MOTIVATED; POOR LEADERSHIP 
P O S S I B L E             1  
 
4.  NEGOTIATING A CONTRACT 
   WITH CLEAR LANGUAGE THAT ADDRES ALL ISSUES      1 
   TIME CONSUMING, COSTLY, POLITICAL VOLATILE      1 
 
5.  CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING        
   AT LEAST 35 PLACES (OUT OF 91) CHOSE TO INCUR                    3 
OVERHEAD COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CONTRACT  
MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING  
        















III  WILL CONTRACTING RESULT IN COST-SAVINGS? 
In the preceding section dealing with Advantages and Drawbacks we saw that 
among municipal administrators who have experience with contracting there is no clear 
prevailing view one way or the other.  About as many indicated a clear cost savings 
advantage, as there were persons, who took the opposite view, that contracting does not 
result in cost savings.  How can this be understood?  And what further evidence exists in 
relation to this question? 
It can be argued that a contractor can generate cost saving by, among other things: 
   cutting staff through mechanization 
   offering more training opportunities 
   improving energy efficiency 
   economies of scale in purchasing  
Savings in these areas would clearly lower the total cost of operating the utility.  
However, this lower cost is not what is being charged.  The contracting firm has a head 
office which charges contract “overhead” and a profit margin.  Municipal administrators 
indicated that the order of magnitude for these two items is around 15%.  Furthermore, 
prudent municipalities also incur contract management and monitoring costs. Therefore, 
the total cost for the municipality would only be less if the cost-savings identified above 
exceed the contracting firm’s overhead-charge and profit margin plus the municipality’s 
contract management and monitoring costs.  The next question is:  is there a literature on 
cost comparison? 
In contrast with privatization of water supply, no systematic studies examining 
cost comparisons of wastewater treatment could be found.  To the general question, “Can 
public employees compete with private ownership?”  Spulber and Sabbaghi (1994) 
responded that in their view:  
“Public ownership is not inherently less efficient than private ownership, and 
public ownership carries less risk.  For utilities, inefficiency often stems from 
isolation from effective competition rather than ownership per se” (as quoted in 




Peterson (1994) states: 
“Ensuring cost-effectiveness, not just the lowest cost, requires thorough 
evaluation.  Yet, many public entities realize cost-savings. In most contract 
operations, 10% to 15% of budget will be saved, and in others savings of 25% or 
more are reached”   (pp. 59,60.) 
Unfortunately, for the purpose of comparison, Peterson was unable to attach 
magnitudes to the public sector savings he referred to.  Illustrations of such savings and 
the importance of a sense of competition can be found in Robinson (1998).  In her article, 
Robinson profiles three large public water agencies that had answered the competitive 
wake-up call and are changing the way they do business. These changes resulted in 
public sector cost savings 
Peterson’s statement illustrates a fundamental methodological point.  The relevant 
cost comparison is not one of before-and-after, but rather one of without-and-with con-
tracting.  Over time as improvements are made, cost-savings can well occur under either 
regime.  What ultimately matters is under which regime, public sector or private sector 
management, are such cost-savings the largest. 
A very simple and crude illustration of this methodological point is found in 
Shaoul (1997).  The numbers employed in the water industry in England, and Wales in 
1989, just prior to privatization, were 47,810.  By 1995 this number had declined, in part 
due to privatization, to 37,555.  Efficiency gains?  Perhaps.  However, to put this in 
perspective, it should be noted that in 1981 the labor force was 62,385, almost 15,000 
more than in 1989.  Like the private sector, the public sector had also managed to reduce 
the labor force substantially. 
Returning to our basic question whether contracting wastewater treatment will 
result in cost-savings, the short answer that perhaps explains the absence of systematic 
analysis is found in Wright, Rubin and Powers (1996).  They point out that: 
“Fears and myths surrounding wastewater privatization are rampant these days 
because there isn’t a lot of objective data on its cost effectiveness.” (p.24) 
There is no lack of data pertaining to the United States water supply industry.  We 




comparative efficiency studies have been conducted and published since the mid-1970’s.  
Donahue (1989) reviewed seven studies, listed below, and concluded: 
“The weight of evidence, then, favors the conclusion that there is no tendency for 
private water utilities to be any more productive” (p.75) 
 
Water Supply Efficiency 
Study Conclusion 
Mann and Mikesell, 1976  Public more efficient 
Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978  Private more efficient* 
Bruggink, 1982  Public more efficient 
Feigenbaum and Teeples, 1983  No significant difference 
Feigenbaul, Teeples, and Glyer, 1986  No significant difference 
Byrners, Grosskopf, and Hayes, 1986  No significant difference 
Teeples and Glyer, 1987  No significant difference 
 
Source:  Donahue (1989) 
 
Lambert, Dichen, and Raffiee, 1993  No significant difference 
Bhattacharyya, Harris, Naraynan and Raffiee, 1995 Public more efficient on average 
* Due to a methodological question this finding is not supported by Bhattacharyya et al 
(1994.) 
The studies by Lambert et al (1993) and Bhattacharyya et al (1995) examine more recent 
data.  Their findings are consistent with those of the earlier studies. 
 
IV  EFFLUENT QUALITY:  Public vs Private Sector Performance 
The goals of a firm are commonly assumed to be profit maximization and, 
indirectly, cost minimization.  What are the goals of the public sector manager?  We will 
skip the theoretical literature on this subject and go directly to the results of our survey of 
opinions.  First, we will briefly examine the performance results. 
In Table 3 we find the performance levels of 155 municipal operations in Ontario 
over a six-year period, 1992 – 1997.  What is striking about the results is that many plants 
emit even less than 25% of what the permit would allow for BOD, Suspended Solids and 
Phosphorus.  The group of plants that emits 50% or less, consists of 84% of the plant in 




Phosphorus.  These results amount to what may be labeled a substantial “voluntary over 
compliance.”   
 
TABLE 3 
COMPLIANCE OF ONTARIO MUNICIPALITIES WITH 1997                                            
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PERIOD 1992 – 1997 






RANGE  No. %  No. % No.  % No.  % 
0 – 25%  67  43.2  32  20.5  18  11.6  22  14.2 
26 – 50% 63 40.6 69 44.5 62 40.0 83 53.5 
0 – 50%  130  83.8  101  65.1  80  51.6  105  67.7 
  
50 – 75%  22  14.2  35  22.6  55  35.5  38  24.5 
76 – 100%  3  2.0  9  5.8  9  5.8  7  4.5 
>100% 0  0.0  10  6.5  11  7.1  5  3.2 
TOTAL  155 100.0  155 100.0 155  100.0 155  100.0 
 
Why do we see consistently such excellent results?  We gained some insight into 
this question by interviewing a number of persons who are, or had been, directly or 
indirectly involved in the decision making process.  The offices held by the public sector 
decision- makers that were interviewed are listed below.  The main explanations given 
for voluntary overcompliance are found in Table 4. 
   Current treatment plant superintendents 
   Recently retired treatment plant superintendents 
   Treatment plant chemists 
   A privatization contact supervisor (former plant superintendent) 
   A regional water and wastewater division manager 








Table 4           VOLUNTARY OVERCOMPLIANCE:  EXPLANATIONS 
1.  “EXPECTED TO MEET THE STANDARDS ALL THE TIME” 
(In contrast with achieving annual and monthly averages; weekly samples to be 
sent to Toronto…) 
2.  “FEAR OF LOSING JOB; ALWAYS ON THE DEFENSIVE” 
(If you screw up, you are on your own…”) 
3.  ‘NOT ENOUGH CONTROL (OVER THE PROCESS) TO ALLOW FOR 
HIGHER NUMBERS” 
4.  “OPERATOR PRIDE AND SATISFACTION; CONFERENCE AWARDS” 
5.  “EXTRA COSTS RELATIVELY SMALL; NO NEED TO SAVE THE EXTRA 
COST” 
6.  “AS A PUBLIC SERVANT, DO THE BEST WE CAN FOR OUR PUBLIC 
EVEN IF IT COSTS A LITTLE MORE” 
7.  “OPERATE TO THE BEST CAPABILITY OF THE FACILITY” 
(Ontario Clean Water Agency – operating plants) 
8.  “WE ARE DOWNSTREAM FROM OURSELVES” 
(Drinking water inlet – wastewater outlet; avoid odor/algae trouble) 
9.  “TO ‘STRETCH’ TREATMENT CAPACITY” 
(To enable further housing and industrial development) 
 
The explanations given represent a variety of motivations.  They range from 
playing safe (#1 - #3); to operator pride and satisfaction (#4), to serving the public 
interest even when this involves some additional cost (#5 - #9). By way of contrast, 
which of these motivations would play a role for a private sector manager?  The answer is 
quite possibly limited to #3, “not enough control”, and #4 “operator pride and 
satisfaction”.  On the basis of this we would predict that contract operated plants will not 
perform nearly as well as their public sector counterparts.  Is this consistent with the 




voluntary overcompliance by 73 United States contract operated plants for which we 
have data is about the same as that of Ontario’s public sector plants (Table 5, summary of 
Table 3). 
TABLE 5 
COMPLIANCE OF ONTARIO MUNICIPALITIES WITH 1997 
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PERIOD 1992 – 1997 






RANGE %  %  %  % 
0 – 25%  43.2  20.5  11.6  14.2 
26 – 50% 40.6 44.5 40.0 53.5 
0 – 50%  83.8  65.1  51.6  67.7 
 
50 – 75%  14.2  22.6  35.5  24.5 
76 – 100%  2.0  5.8  5.8  4.5 
>100% 0.0  6.5  7.1  3.2 
 
TABLE 6A 
COMPLIANCE OF U. S. CONTRACT OPERATE PLANTS IN 2001 






(n = 73) 
PHOSPHORUS 
(n = 11) 
RANGE %  %  % 
0 – 25%  33.3  36.1  18.2 
26 – 50% 36.2 41.7 18.2 
0 – 50%  69.5  77.5  36.4 
 
51 – 75%  15.9  13.9  36.4 
76 – 100%  11.6  5.6  27.3 





This unexpected and rather surprising finding leads to a follow up question. 
About one-half of these 73 plants pass through the electricity cost (and some other costs) 
to the municipality.  Clearly electricity costs are performance related, and one would 
expect that in cases where the contracting firm can pass these costs on, the performance 
would be better.  In Table 6B, the two groups of plants, without and with pass through 
costs, are side-by-side.  The table shows that this expectation is also not born out by the 
facts.  Again the performance of these two sub-groups of contract operated plants is about 
the same.  In other words, whether or not the contracting firm bears the electricity costs, 
etc., appears to make no difference. 
TABLE 6B 
CONTRACTS WITHOUT AND WITH PASS THROUGH COSTS 
ACTUAL 
REQUIRED 
WITH NO PASS THROUGH 
COSTS (n = 37) 
 
WITH PASS THROUGH 
 COSTS (n = 36) 
  BOD  SUSP. SOLIDS  BOD  SUSP. SOLIDS 
RANGE %  %  %  % 
0 – 25%  40.5  37  22.2  32.5 
26 – 50% 35 39.5 36.1 43.3 
0 – 50%  75.5  76.5  58.3  75.7 
        
51 – 75%  13.5  13.5  16.7  13.5 
76 – 100%  5.5  2.5  16.7  8.1 
> 100%  5.5  5.5  8.3  2.7 
 
At this point a word of caution is in order.  The Ontario group of plants consists of 
all plants, which emit wastewater directly, or indirectly into Lake Erie or Lake Ontario.  
On the other hand, the group of United States plants is only a sample, and not necessarily 
a random sample.  There may well be an element of self-selection among the ones who 
responded and the ones that did not respond to our request to complete the questionnaire. 
We did gain some insights regarding low level emissions from additional 




  “The contractor achieves the lowest discharge standards possible.   
  With a sequential batch reactor design there are no additional electrical 
costs associated with the lower emissions.  In fact, achieving lower 
BOD and SS levels allows the plant to lower chemical costs” 
The other two comments focussed on the installation of bubblers. 
“The contractor persuaded the City to install several energy savings 
projects including fine bubble diffusers.  Addition of the bubblers also 
improved the discharge quality.” 
In these cases there are chemical cost savings and electrical cost savings in 
concert with a higher quality effluent.  Unfortunately we do not know to how many cases 
these explanations apply.   
There are at least two further possible general explanations for voluntary 
overcompliance by contract operators. 
1)  The incremental costs of achieving these excellent results are relatively small. 
2)  Contractors are also public interest oriented and value the goodwill that stems 
from their high-level performance. 
In the absence of data on performance related incremental cost or what, in detail, 
motivates the managers of private sector firms, we are unable to determine the 
significance of these considerations.  What is clear is that pure and simple short-run profit 
maximization does not appear to rule the day-to-day decision-making. 
A final question is what, if anything do the excellent performers have in common?  
Three criteria were examined:  1) volume, represented by average daily flow; 2) capacity 
utilization rate, and 3) relative cost of operation per million gallons a day of average daily 
flow. We found that at each performance level 0-25%, 26-50%, etc. there are plants of all 
sizes, plants with high capacity utilization rates, and there are plants whose unit costs are 









V SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION 
The main conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows: 
1.  The privatization of the water industry in England and Wales in 1989 is 
commonly referred to as complete privatization.  Ten large regional wastewater 
supply and wastewater treatment firms, regulated by a national agency, were 
created.  In Canada and the United States privatization of wastewater treatment 
usually takes the form of public-private partnership where service provision is 
contracted out for a specified number of years to a private firm.  The scope for 
regulation is much more limited compared to under complete privatization. 
2.  Few municipalities in Ontario engage private firms to provide water supply or 
wastewater treatment services.  This can in part be explained by the presence of 
the Ontario Clean Water Agency, a public sector agency, which actively competes 
for contracts with private sector firms. 
3.  Contracting for wastewater treatment is a relatively new phenomenon in Canada 
and the United States.  Major advantages of contracting can explain why some 
municipalities have decided to engage the services of a private firm.  Major 
disadvantages, on the other hand, explain why there are also municipalities that 
have terminated their contract or have decided not to renew. 
4.  Whether or not contracting for wastewater treatment services results in a cost 
savings is unclear.  Over time, and in particular in the presence of competition, 
both public sector management and private sector management can improve 
operational efficiency and generate cost-savings.  Lack of objective data on cost-
effectiveness underlies the absence of systematic analysis, 
5.  A number of earlier as well as two more recent studies of the United States water 
supply industry find no evidence to support the claim that private water utilities 
are more efficient than their public sector counterparts. 
6.  The effluent quality of Ontario’s public sector plants and the sample of United 
States contract operated plants in this study is by-and-large excellent.  Under both 
management regimes a large majority of plants emits less than one-half of BOD, 
Suspended Solids and Phosphorus allowed by the permit.  Interviews with a 




“voluntary over-compliance”.  It is unclear on the other hand why the for-profit 
contract operated plants produced similar excellent results. If the sample of 
questionnaires examined in this study is reasonably representative of the 
population, we can be conclude that the privatization of wastewater treatment 
does not pose a threat to environmental quality. 
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